EL TRATADO DE NO PROLIFERACION NUCLEAR, UNAS
LECTURAS Y UN COMENTARIO (L. B.-B., 4-9-06)
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
Opened
for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 1 July 1968
Entered into force: 5 March 1970
Depositary Governments: Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and United States of America
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties
to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear
war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a
war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the
danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling
for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of
nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further
the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of
source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other
techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear
technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by
nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should
be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are
entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific
information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States
to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the
direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning
nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its
Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening
of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture
of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the
elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their
delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States
must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that
the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be
promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and
economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly,
or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with
the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed
under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures
for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to
source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed
or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The
safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of
such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes,
unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner
designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the
economic or technological development of the Parties or international
co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the
international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing,
use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with
the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in
the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with
the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article
either individually or together with other States in accordance with the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such
agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of
this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or
accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter
into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of
negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in
contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations
to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to
the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the
world.
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure
that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international
observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential
benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made
available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a
non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive
devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and
development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to
obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or
agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate
representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall
commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force.
Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such
benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude
regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in
their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of
any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which
shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do
so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary
Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the
Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of
all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that
deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of
such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including
the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated,
are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the
deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of
Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review
the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of
five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by
submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the
convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the
operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does
not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3
of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the
Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other
States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of
ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one
which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to 1 January 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on
the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty,
and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other
notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to
the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of
its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to
the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference
shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.
This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which
are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the
Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first
day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
LECTURA DE LAS
PAGINAS 404-405 DEL LIBRO “WORLD POLITICS”, DE CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR &
EUGENE R. WITTKOPF, Seventh Edition, 1999. MacMillan Press Ltd.
Este es
un buen libro para iniciarse en el estudio de las relaciones internacionales.
Yo dispongo solamente, de momento, de la séptima edición de 1999, aunque existe
otra del año corriente que se pude conseguir en Amazon. Es un libro exhaustivo
---en el sentido de los contenidos y del esfuerzo--- de unas seiscientas
páginas y muy actualizado y recomendable como manual o libro de consulta.
Sostengo esta afirmación aunque discrepo de algunas de las ideas
expuestas por los autores (L. B.-B.).
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) an international agreement that seeks to prevent
horizontal proliferation by prohibiting nuclear weapons sales, acquistions, or
production.
THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME. THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
(NPT),
first signed in 1968, seeks to prevent further proliferation. Since the
nonproliferation regime went into force on March 5, 1970, 186 states have
become members. NPT membership is divided into two categories: nuclear weapon
states and nonnuclear weapon states. Nuclear states were defined as those that
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967. This
definition included only China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States—all of which are members of the NPT. All other parties to the
agreement are nonnuclear weapon states.
The NPT strikes a bargain between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.
Under the treaty, the non-nuclear weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear
weapons and to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards over all of their nuclear materials to ensure that they are used
exclusively for peaceful purposes. In exchange, the nuclear weapon states agree
to freely share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and technology and not
t6o assist other states to acquire nuclear weapons.
In addition, the nuclear weapon states pledged to pursue "good
faith" negotiations toward an end to the arms race and toward general and
complete disarmament. (Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, October 1,
1995, 1) Despite the apparent success of the NPT, the obstacles to increased
proliferation are fragile, as shown by the nuclear development programs of
India and Pakistan in 1998. The incentives to join the nuclear club are strong
for several reasons.
First, the materials needed to make a nuclear weapon are widely
available. This is partly due to the widespread use of nuclear technology for
generating electricity. Today hundreds of nuclear power and research reactors
are in operation in dozens of countries throughout the world. In addition to
spreading nuclear know-how, states could choose to reprocess the uranium and
plutonium that power plants produce as waste for clandestine nuclear weapons
production.
By the year 2000, commercial reprocessing reactors could be producing
enough plutonium to make thirty-seven thousand nuclear weapons (Sivard
1993, 13).
Second, the scientific expertise necessary for weapons development has
spread with the globalization of advanced scientific training. "In the
near future it will be possible to duplicate almost all past technology in all
but the most forlorn of Third World backwaters, and much of the present
state-of-theart will be both intellectually and practically accessible"
(Clancy and Seitz 1991-1992).
Third, export controls designed to stop technology transfer for military
purposes are weak. "A large and growing number of states can now export
material, equipment, technology, and services needed to develop nuclear
weapons" (Potter 1992). In addition, the leaks in nuclear export controls
make "a mockery of the long-revered nuclear nonproliferation regime"
(Leventhal 1992).
Conversion of peacetime nuclear energy programs to military purposes can
occur either overtly or, as in the case of India and Pakistan covertly. The
safeguards built into the nonproliferation regime are simply inadequate to
detect and prevent secret nuclear weapons development programs.
The ease with which Pakistan made a successful end run around the
technology-export controls of the United States and western European
governments illustrates the problem of control. In 1979 Pakistan quietly bought
all the basic parts—allegedly with funds supplied by the Libyan government—necessary
for a uranium-enrichment plant. Similarly, UN inspectors discovered after the
Persian Gulf War that Iraq was much closer to building an atomic weapon than
previously suspected, despite UN restrictions against this and Iraq's continued
pledge to adhere to the rules of the nonproliferation regime. Iraq managed to
resist the efforts of UN inspections to freely investigate possible production
and storage sites for weapons of mass destruction within Iraq, as called for by
the peace agreement, throughout 1997 and early 1998. The Iraqi experience
illustrates the obstacles to preventing the illegal proliferation of
weapons, as does the record elsewhere. No less than eight countries have
constructed secret nuclear production plants, underscoring the difficulties of
managing effective inspections and monitoring nuclear developments (Albright
1993).
Fourth, other states have strong incentives to develop nuclear weapons
similar to those once cited by the members of the nuclear club. French
President Charles de Gaulle argued that, without an independent nuclear
capability, France could not "command its own destiny." Similarly, in
1960 Britain's Labour Party leader Aneurin Bevan asserted that without the bomb
Britain would go "naked into the council chambers of the world." And
in 1993 North Korean President Kim Il Sung defiantly withdrew from the
nonproliferation pact, refusing to allow even routine monitoring of his
country's five declared nuclear sites at Yongbyon. The desire to act
independently and to assert North Korea's power and independence were the
primary motives. In response to President Clinton's June 1994 pledge that the
United States "would not allow North Korea to develop a nuclear
bomb," North Korea dug in its heels. Reluctantly, however, it agreed to
freeze its nuclear development program in October 1994.
Many nonnuclear states want the same command of their own fate and the
same diplomatic influence that the nuclear powers seem to enjoy. Why, non-nuclear
states ask, should they heed a nonproliferation agreement that dooms them to
others' domination and security guarantees? Consider Iran's sentiments: In
January 1992 its spiritual leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that
the United States had no business questioning the nuclear weapons program
designed to make Iran the most powerful military force in the Persian Gulf.
"Iran's revolutionary Muslim people recognize no false hegemony for
America or any other power," he exclaimed. Similarly, in November 1993,
Pakistan's Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, asserted that "It is degrading
and humiliating to expect Pakistan to roll back its nuclear program."
Pakistan developed a nuclear capability, she explained, to deter India, its
archenemy. India shouldered its way into the ranks of the nuclear powers in
1998 a month after Pakistan tested the Ghaura missle to counter the perceived
threat of Pakistan and achieve the respect that India has long craved.
Nuclear Disarmament? Some see the end of the Cold War as an opportunity
to begin eliminating nuclear weapons. In 1992 Russia advocated complete nuclear
disarmament. Moreover, the United States and Russia undertook a number of
important steps toward meaningful disarmament (see Chapter 15).
This set the stage for expanding the nonproliferation regime. In
accordance with the provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty, 175 of its
signatories met in the 1995 arms control conference in New York to decide, by
majority vote, whether the NPT should remain in force indefinitely or be
extended only for an additional fixed period or periods.
HEZBOLLAH
en la “Enciclopedia
Británica” 2006
Arabic
Ḥizb Allāh (“Party of God”), also spelled
Hezbullah or Hizbullah militia group and political party that
first emerged as a faction in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion of that country in 1982.
Shīʿite Muslims, traditionally the weakest religious group in Lebanon, first
found their voice in the moderate, and largely secular, Amal movement.
Following the Islamic Revolution in Shīʿite Iran in 1979 and the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a group of Lebanese Shīʿite clerics formed Hezbollah
with the goal of driving Israel from Lebanon and establishing an Islamic state
there. Based in the predominately Shīʿite areas of the Biqāʿ
Valley, southern Lebanon, and southern Beirut, Hezbollah coordinated its
efforts closely with Iran, from whom it acquired substantial logistical
support, and drew its manpower largely from disaffected younger, more radical
members of Amal. Throughout the 1980s Hezbollah engaged in increasingly
sophisticated attacks against Israel and fought in Lebanon's civil war
(1975–90), including repeatedly coming to blows with fellow Shīʿite
Amal. During this time, Hezbollah allegedly engaged in terrorist attacks
including kidnappings and car bombings, directed predominantly against
Westerners, but also established a comprehensive social services network for
its supporters.
Hezbollah
was one of the few militia groups not disarmed by the Syrians at the end of the
civil war, and they continued to fight a sustained guerrilla campaign against
Israel in southern Lebanon until Israel's withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah emerged
as a leading political party in post-civil war Lebanon.
|
El Partido
de Dios, un movimiento de complicada etiquetación |
|
|
|
ALFONSO
ZALDIVAR en “El Mundo” del 18.08.06
|
¿Qué es Hizbulá? Hizbulá es una organización político-militar
chií, creada en el Líbano en 1982 con el objetivo de repeler la invasión
israelí. Quiere decir «partido de Dios» y la lidera el jeque Hasán Nasrala.
¿Cuáles son sus motivaciones? Aparte de mantener el Ejército
israelí alejado del Líbano, pretende implantar un Estado «que aplique los
valores del islam».
¿Qué relación mantienen Israel y el Líbano? Es importante
recordar que, al crearse en 1948 el Estado de Israel, muchos palestinos
encuentraron refugio en el sur del Líbano. Desde ahí, se organizó la
resistencia. Las incursiones israelíes en el sur del país de los cedros en 1978
y en 1982 y su posterior asentamiento tenían como objetivo mantener controlados
los brotes de la intifada.
¿En qué circunstancias se creó? Como respuesta a la segunda
incursión militar de Israel en el sur del Líbano, se organizó la milicia
Hizbulá. Los Guardianes de la Revolución de Irán prestaron todo su apoyo al
grupo paramilitar y Siria se inmiscuyó también en su financiación y
preparación. Hoy, estos países son los mecenas oficiales de Hizbulá.
¿Qué poder tiene? Hizbulá goza de buena prensa dentro del Líbano.
Su brazo político tiene influencia tanto en el Parlamento libanés (14 diputados
de 128) como en el Gobierno (dos ministros).Así, el presidente libanés
(prosirio) Émile Lahoud declaró, el día 10 de agosto, que «Hizbulá forma parte
del Ejército del Líbano».Además, su red de asistencia social no le ha creado
sino simpatías entre la población musulmana, mayoritaria en el Líbano.
¿Son terroristas? Aparte del lanzamiento de cohetes de corto
alcance katiusha contra objetivos civiles israelíes, a Hizbulá se le achacan
varios ataques con coche bomba contra embajadas de Israel en varios países. En
1985, supuestamente perpetró el atentado del restaurante El Descanso de Madrid,
que acabó con la vida de 15 personas. Por ello y a través de la resolución
1559, Naciones Unidas exigió su desarme. También, el Departamento de Estado
norteamericano ha incluido el movimiento en su lista de organizaciones
terroristas. La Unión Europea no acaba de hacer lo propio, aunque una
resolución no vinculante del Europarlamento en 2005 sí lo etiquetó de
terrorista. El Ejecutivo español se posiciona con la UE en la prudencia de
calificarlo.
What Is Hamas?
washingtonpost.com Staff Writer
Monday, July 17, 2006; 5:11 PM
Hamas
·
Leader: Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (right);
military leader Khaled Meshal
·
Founded: 1987
·
Funded: Donations; wealthy Arab sponsors;
growing amount of Iranian assistance
Major
Attacks
·
November 2002: suicide bombing of Jerusalem bus kills
11
·
September 2003: double suicide bombing kills 15 people
at Jerusalem café and an army base
·
June 2003: suicide bombing of bus kills 19
·
March 2004: a joint Hamas-Fatah suicide bombing of
Israeli port kills 10
·
June 2004: rocket attack kills Israeli man,
4-year-old child
·
April 2006: suicide bombing of Tel Aviv restaurant
kills 9, wounds 40
Sources: Washington Post; Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, CNN, BBC
Hamas is the Arabic acronym for the
Islamic Resistance Movement, a Palestinian organization committed to
eliminating Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state. Considered a
terrorist organization by the United States and the West for its suicide
attacks on Israel, it is popular among Palestinians for its network of schools,
clinics and civic services, as well as its armed resistance to Israeli military
occupation. The group is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an
Egyptian-based organization that has advocated Islamic government in the Arab
world for 80 years.
Hamas came to prominence in the
1990s by rejecting the so-called Oslo peace process which sought to establish a
Palestinian state alongside Israel. In a series of deadly suicide bombings that
killed hundreds of civilians, Hamas announced its intention to eliminate the
Jewish state altogether. Israel retaliated by assassinating the group's
founder, Sheik Ahmed Yassin and numerous top operatives who were immediately
replaced.
Hamas entered electoral politics
for the first time in 2004. In January 2006, Hamas candidates swept Palestinian
parliamentary elections and took control of the Palestinian Authority, which
governs the Palestinian areas now under Israeli military occupation. Western
countries have since cut off most aid to the Palestinian government and
redirected support to President Mahmound Abbas, leader of the Fatah party, and
to non-governmental agencies working with Palestinians.
The Hamas-led government refuses
to recognize Israel and renounce armed struggle, as demanded by Israel, the
United States and Europe. Hamas has demanded Israel withdraw to its pre-1967
borders, release thousands of political prisoners and recognize the right of
Palestinians to return to communities absorbed by the creation of Israel in 1948.
There is debate within Hamas
about how far to go in meeting Israeli and American demands. Prime Minister
Ismail Haniyeh says Hamas's goal is the creation of a Palestinian state in the pre-1967
borders of West Bank and Gaza. The group's military wing, based in Syria, says
it will only consider a long-term truce when Israel withdraws from the West
Bank.
The tacit cease-fire between the
Hamas-led government and Israel started to break down this spring, as militants
from both Hamas and Fatah fired hundreds of home-made rockets from Gaza into
nearby Israeli towns, causing few injuries but sowing fear and uncertainty.
Israel responded with massive artillery and air attacks on suspected missile
factories and launching sites, killing scores of civilians.
Hamas's capture of an Israeli
soldier on June 29 marked a new tactic in the group's strategy for fighting
Israeli military occupation. The militants are demanding the release of about
400 Palestinian women and teenagers held in Israeli jails in return for the
release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit.
Some observers say the Hamas
abduction reflects the influence of Hezbollah, the Shiite militia in
neighboring Lebanon. Hezbollah's leader obtained the release of hundreds of
Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jail in 2004 by handing over an
Israeli businessman kidnapped in Beirut. While the two groups have deep
religious differences, some experts say Hezbollah is now supplying Hamas with
weapons, training and advice.
UN COMENTARIO
Lo que
está sucediendo es que la tensión en el Oriente Próximo se eleva, Israel se
siente más asediado que antes, e Irán lleva toreando a la comunidad
internacional durante los últimos tiempos en el tema nuclear, pues se niega a
admitir los controles previstos en el TNP por parte de la AIEA (Agencia
Internacional de la Energía Atómica), al mismo tiempo que amenaza con la
destrucción de Israel y pone en acción su peón (Hezbollá, principalmente, pero
Hamás como complemento) para dañar a Israel.
La ONU ha
dado un ultimátum para que Irán paralice los procesos de enriquecimiento de
material nuclear sin control y con fines potencialmente agresivos, e Irán
ha rechazado el ultimátum de las Naciones Unidas.
Lo ideal
sería que Irán continuara con su proceso de desarrollo político paralizado los
últimos años, y comenzara a jugar un papel positivo en la estabilización del
Próximo Oriente, abriendo su régimen político, aceptando los controles de la
AIEA, reconociendo a Israel, e iniciando conversaciones con los EEUU, a fin de
iniciar un proceso de reconciliación internacional que cerrara la brecha
abierta en los inicios del régimen fundamentalista. Algunas voces que se oyen
en su interior parecen preconizar esta evolución, pero otras refuerzan el
cierre y el fundamentalismo. Y que Irán se vaya en una u otra dirección es muy
determinante para impulsar u obstaculizar una evolución positiva en todo el
Próximo Oriente. Kissinguer lo apuntaba días atrás, y es posible que el
Gobierno norteamericano sea receptivo a iniciar un proceso de conversaciones
para tantear esta posibilidad. La UE debería ayudar en ello, y ¿quizá los chiís
iraquíes? ¿Ha metido la pata Felipe González o está en esta onda?
De
momento, ambas posibilidades están abiertas, y la Comunidad Internacional debe
estar alerta y poner firmeza y plazos. La decantación de la situación es
crítica en estos momentos. Ojalá que haya lucidez en ambas partes: no creo que
sea exagerado decir que el Mundo se juega la paz en estos momentos, y el
Oriente Próximo su desarrollo o degradación mayor (L. B.-B., 4-9-06, 10:30)