RETHINKING IRAQ'S ELECTION
Artículo de Samir
S.M. Sumaidaie, Iraq's ambassador to the United
Nations, en “The Washington Post” del 28/12/04
Por
su interés y relevancia, he seleccionado el artículo que sigue para incluirlo en
este sitio web. (L. B.-B.)
Con un muy breve comentario a pie de título:
ADAPTACION FLEXIBLE (L. B.-B., 28-12-04, 19:30)
Este artículo resulta interesante porque busca
adaptar flexiblemente el calendario y secuencia del proceso de transición a las
exigencias y dificultades de la situación. Uno, a tanta distancia, no puede
evaluar la solución mejor, pero sí afirmar que caben distintas opciones para
adaptar el proceso a la realidad. Aunque siempre hay que tener en cuenta que el
retraso o suspensión transitoria de las elecciones en zona sunní
puede permitir al enemigo concentrar fuerzas en otras partes del territorio
iraquí y desestabilizar la situación también allí.
No obstante, si que cabe
utilizar la imaginación para buscar soluciones: se comentaba estos días la
posibilidad de reservar escaños o ministerios a sunnís,
para mantenerlos integrados en el proceso constituyente. Pero además, también
cabe pensar, como sostiene el artículo que comento, en aplazar el período de
comienzo de redacción y aprobación de la Constitución hasta que un gobierno
legítimo pueda controlar mejor la seguridad en todo el territorio. Cabría
también pensar en alargar el período electoral en territorio sunní, de modo que las elecciones en dicho territorio se
fueran celebrando más lentamente, o celebrarlas lentamente en algunas zonas y
aplazarlas en otras.
Se puede utilizar la imaginación para buscar
soluciones que permitan mantener efectivo el conjunto del proceso, ralentizarlo
en las zonas peores, pero evitar dar más margen de acción a terroristas
y rebeldes.
The
interim Iraqi government faces a stark choice: whether to go ahead with the
planned elections on Jan. 30 or postpone them. It has so far stood firm on its
decision to stick to the schedule. The argument for doing so is compelling.
Legally, the interim government is bound by the stipulations of the
Transitional Administrative Law, which determined that elections be held before
the end of January 2005, and by Security Council Resolution 1546, which
confirmed the timetable and gave the commitment an international dimension.
Morally,
delaying elections would be seen by insurgents as a victory, encouraging them
to redouble their efforts to derail the political process. Moreover, a large
segment of Iraq's people is eagerly awaiting elections and will feel cheated of
their legitimate right if they are postponed. Nor would postponing the
elections by a few months necessarily bring about any significant improvement
in security conditions. In fact, it would probably create a disgruntled
population of restive parties in southern Iraq, in addition to the violent and
emboldened insurgents of the northwest.
But
to hold elections under current circumstances, when a sizable part of the
country is not secure, just for the sake of voting, would produce a
disproportionate and nonrepresentative national
assembly. Far from stabilizing the country, this could be a recipe for a
greater rebellion. If the national assembly then proceeded to write the
permanent constitution, a significant number of Iraqis would feel marginalized
and shortchanged. Their nonparticipation would be due not to any lack of desire
to vote but rather to the lack of security.
So
far this issue has been presented through public debates in Iraq and in the
United States in binary terms: We either postpone the elections or keep to the
timetable. Yet there is a third way forward -- namely, to go ahead with the
elections but set criteria for their inclusiveness that would have to be met
before the newly elected national assembly would be allowed to produce a
permanent constitution. A criterion that could be agreed to by the major
political players in the country might be set out in terms of differences in
turnout. For example, if the turnout in two or three provinces was less than half
that of the rest of the country, the assembly might not be considered
sufficiently balanced to commit the country to a permanent constitution.
Of
course, this idea may be implemented in more than one way. One possible
mechanism could be to leave a number of seats vacant for the underrepresented
provinces. Details could be worked out, and it is not beyond the ingenuity of
Iraqi political leaders to devise a mechanism that is both workable and fair.
Such a solution would have the merit of satisfying all those who want elections
as soon as possible, thus denying terrorists a victory while producing a
legitimate elected government that could focus on stabilizing the country. When
that was achieved, another round of elections could be held to produce a more
representative national assembly that could command the confidence of the whole
country for writing a permanent constitution.
What
is the downside? One obvious disadvantage is the delay in writing the permanent
constitution. This, in my view, is a price worth paying for more stability.
Another is the potential of giving the insurgents a victory by delaying the
constitution indefinitely. But such an idea presumes that an elected
government, acting with the help of the international community, would fail to
make meaningful progress on the security front. That is by no means certain. In
fact, an elected government would have a much better chance of stabilizing Iraq
than the current interim government.
It
might be argued that the Transitional Administrative Law already has a built-in
safety valve in the shape of the stipulated referendum that specifies that if
three of Iraq's provinces reject the draft permanent constitution, it would
have to be redrafted. That is not the same, because without sufficient assurances
made clear in advance, the road to the referendum could be very bumpy indeed.
We need to put out a powerful message of inclusiveness, partnership and even
mutual esteem, and to put it out now.
At
this juncture we need understanding no less than force, and wisdom no less than
clear goals. If a consensus can be reached, Iraq can approach the international
community and ask for a Security Council resolution endorsing its decision to
postpone the writing of its permanent constitution. Even if that proves to be
difficult or time-consuming, it could be argued that a consensus within Iraq
(e.g., a unanimous or near unanimous resolution by the interim national
assembly backed by the interim government and some key political parties) is
sufficient to adapt the political process to current realities.
One
other thing could also be very helpful: a delay in the election date of just
two or three weeks, primarily to give time for realistic arrangements for
out-of-country voting and to better secure and prepare for the elections inside
Iraq. Only one week has been set aside for voter registration of Iraqis in 14
countries. Considering that all eligible voters have to register in person,
this is hardly enough time. And it assumes that by that time, all these countries
would have agreed to allow elections to be conducted in their territories. At
this point only one of these countries has signed up.
The
electoral process is subject to an impractically tight schedule. While we must
demonstrate commitment to the overall political process and its timelines, we
must not be enslaved by it.