Artículo de AMATZIA BARAM en “The New York Times” del 28.10.2003
El formateado es mío (L. B.-B.)
While we do not yet know who was responsible for the latest series of attacks across Iraq, there is no question that some of the bombings — including, American officials suspect, the missile attack on the hotel where Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was staying — were the work of forces loyal to Saddam Hussein. That these terrorists, mostly Sunni Muslims from the so-called Sunni Triangle northwest of Baghdad, retain a stubborn fealty to the former dictator seems to puzzle the coalition leadership. But it should not: their loyalty is rooted in part in centuries-old tribal kinship and religious identity. Only by understanding these ties and then using them to its advantage will the coalition authority reduce the resistance.
A letter earlier this month signed by Saddam Hussein and addressed to the sheiks of the Arab tribes in the Sunni Triangle insisted that Iraq "has been a poison" to the American soldiers and that "victory is near." It was one more sign that the former dictator understands that the tribal values of Iraq are ripe for exploitation.
But what works for Saddam Hussein can also be made to work against him. The coalition is eminently capable of winning over many tribes. An old saying in Iraq has it that you cannot buy a tribe, but you can certainly hire one.
And the nation's Sunni minority is open to offers. With Saddam Hussein's downfall, Sunnis, who make up only 15 percent of the population, were deprived of their long-standing political hegemony. The Sunnis from the triangle lost their prestigious and well-paying jobs in the armed forces and internal security apparatus. They were humiliated in the conflict and have had their homes and communities searched in its aftermath. Last but not least: they have been largely frozen out of the Governing Council and the senior bureacracy.
The Sunni network was held together by a web of patronage, perks and favors that filtered down from the presidential palace to the tribal sheik to the "tribesman in the field." Of course, retribution played a role, too. Tribes were severely punished for transgressions (like refusing to abide by the whims of Baathist officials or allowing illicit traffic across borders without the dictator's permission), with the sheiks occasionally deposed and sometimes executed. In the south, whole villages were razed. But much more often the tribes were handsomely rewarded for cooperation — with money, weapons, state lands or even the property of rival clans.
While this network has been fractured, many of the older tenets of tribal life linger, and help to fuel the pattern of violence in the triangle today. Attacks on coalition troops should be viewed through the prism of tribal warfare. This is a world defined in large measure by avenging the blood of a relative (al-tha'r); demonstrating one's manly courage in battle (al-muruwwah); generally upholding one's manly honor (al-sharaf). For some of these young men, killing American soldiers is a political act, but it is also not unlike what hunting lions was to British colonial officers in 19th-century Africa: it involves a certain risk, but the reward is great.
Yes, religious fanaticism may also serve as a motivation, but in Iraq the rural tribes have generally been less inclined toward religious fanaticism than the city dwellers. The problem for the coalition is that religious fanaticism and tribal values are now working in the same direction. The coalition leaders must bear in mind that while the violence is endemic, it is not unstoppable — in large part, we are dealing with people who are open to persuasion.
Specifically, the Governing Council and its American supporters must come up with a coherent tribal policy. Certainly they can be excused for not having one — they've racked up many other achievements while focusing on more pressing problems. Moreover, the hesitation to give power to tribal leaders has been understandable: cultivating the tribes and the sheiks might be seen as a contradiction of the new leaders' stated goal of forming a democratic Iraqi civil society in a modern way. But to avoid increasing violence in the Sunni Triangle, there is a need to rethink that approach.
There are about 10 large tribal federations in central Iraq, but there are hundreds of subgroups, each with its own sheik. He is the leader of the people, and in return for his services — mediation, arbitration, attracting government services to the tribal area — he is respected and obeyed.
New efforts ought to be made to persuade the sheiks to assert their influence and help keep the peace. The easiest would simply be to hire the sheiks and their tribesmen — putting them on salaries and allowing them to spread the wealth among their people. In addition, sheiks in areas where coalition soldiers and oil pipelines are coming under frequent attacks should be told that the only way their tribes can receive luxuries — extra government services, construction aid, easy access to senior officials in Baghdad — is by making sure that there are no attacks against coalition soldiers in their domain.
If a sheik refused to cooperate, not only could his perks be withheld, they could be given to a neighboring sheik. This would eventually pit the uncooperative sheik against his own tribesmen, who would see that he was not serving their interests. If this weren't enough to get the sheik into line, it wouldn't be too difficult for the coalition to enact "regime change" on a small scale: almost every tribal leader has rivals within the group who covet his position.
For such a policy to be effective, however, it would require a deeper sense of local history. The coalition forces and the Governing Council (which is comprised largely of former exiles and urban Iraqis) must start sending civil officials to rural areas for extended periods so they can get a true picture of each region's tribal hierarchy and affairs. And while military units must be rotated, the civil officers should stay on , serving as social guides to the newly arrived units.
It is vital that the coalition officers develop close relationships with the sheiks and other influential figures in the tribes. These men will provide the coalition forces and the Iraqi government with the best information and advice. And the coalition authority should insist that the new Iraqi government set up a bureau for tribal affairs to serve as a repository for knowledge of the tribes and their traditions.
A policy giving special treatment to tribal leaders will have plenty of critics, in Iraq and in America. Yes, it would allow a degree of war-lordism. However, Iraq is not Afghanistan — these tribes are not miniature armies, and the Sunni Triangle is not surrounded by impassable mountains that make policing almost impossible. Most important, the central government in Iraq, with its foreign aid and eventual oil profits, will have far more to offer its tribespeople in terms of services and perks than does its Afghan counterpart.
In the Middle East, more often than not, tribes have been willing to give up a great degree of their autonomy in exchange for government services, and Iraq is no exception. The risk is worth taking.
Amatzia Baram is professor of Middle Eastern History at the University of Haifa in Israel and a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.