BUSH'S WINNING STRATEGY

 Artículo de DAVID BROOKS en “The New York Times” del 03/07/2004

Por su interés y relevancia, he seleccionado el artículo que sigue para incluirlo en este sitio web. (L. B.-B.)

On Sept. 8, 2003, Bush administration officials awoke to find that Paul Bremer III had written an op-ed piece in The Washington Post laying out a seven-step plan for the democratization of Iraq. Bremer hadn't cleared the piece with his higher-ups in the Pentagon or the White House, and here he was describing a drawn-out American occupation. Iraqis would take their time writing a constitution, and would eventually have elections and take control of their country.

For some Bush officials, this was the lowest period of the entire Iraq project. They knew they couldn't sustain an occupation for that long, yet they had no other realistic plan for transferring power to Iraqis. The Governing Council, with its rotating presidency, was hopeless. The whole thing could fall apart.

Pressure mounted for a quicker transfer of sovereignty. In October, Donald Rumsfeld called Bremer home for all-day consultations on how to get a serious interim Iraqi government. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Shiite leader, was demanding elections much sooner, while the official U.S. position was that they should be put off. "How did we end up not being in favor of elections?" President Bush asked.

Finally, on Nov. 7, Bremer called Condoleezza Rice at a Baltimore Ravens-Cleveland Browns football game. Maybe it was time to transfer sovereignty first, and speed things up. Four days later Bremer was at the White House, for a meeting of the minds. That set in train what became known as the Nov. 15 agreement. Sovereignty would be transferred to Iraqis on June 30, 2004.

The diplomatic corps, the think-tank johnnies and the rest of the commentariate went into their usual sky-is-falling mode. This is pure politics, many said. The U.S. is looking for an exit strategy. Karl Rove doesn't want to fight the next elections with 100,000 troops in Iraq.

In fact, the members of the sneering brigade had it backward. The U.S. had to transfer sovereignty precisely so it could stay. This was the only way to get enough legitimacy to fight the insurgents and work on rebuilding. And from those weeks on, the administration was unwavering in its support of the June 30 transfer.

Politically, at least, its constancy is paying off. Since the transfer I've had candid conversations with four senior officials with responsibility for Iraq. They are more cautiously optimistic than at any time over the past year. One puts the odds of a successful outcome at three to one.

Iraq now has a popular government with a tough, capable prime minister. Democratic institutions are emerging, including a culture of compromise. Clerics are now preaching against insurgents. Sistani calls them sinners, and prohibits cooperation.

Thanks, in part, to Bremer's decisiveness, the political transition is going well. It's when you turn to military matters that things look tough. The Iraqis and the Americans now face a choice. U.S. troops can take advantage of this hopeful moment to mount a full-scale assault on the insurgents, or they can hang back and hope that the Iraqis themselves can co-opt or defeat the fighters.

The choice is made more difficult because after more than a year of occupation, officials complain, we still have little information about who the insurgents are, how they operate or what we can do to defeat them.

Nonetheless, it's clear that, with the Iraqis leading and the Americans assenting, there will be no broad offensive against the insurgents anytime soon. This policy seems to be based on a series of guesses: First, that U.S. aggressiveness only exacerbates the insurgency. Second, that Prime Minister Iyad Allawi can cajole or bribe some insurgents into becoming productive members of society. Third, that Iraqis will be able to build a better intelligence force than the Americans and that anti-insurgency efforts will be more effective when more Iraqis are trained and supplied. Fourth, that insurgents will not be able to use this period, and their impunity in Falluja, to organize even more devastating assaults.

These are all questionable propositions. It could be that in a month, Allawi and Bush will have to unleash U.S. forces. Still, stepping back, two things are obvious. This administration can adapt, and stick to a winning strategy once it finds it. Second, the Iraqis really do have a galvanizing hunger for democracy.

Despite the normal flow of bad news, that makes the long-term prospects for success brighter than they appeared a few months ago.