IRAQI INSURGENCY ENTERS A NEW PHASE
Escalation of attacks suggests the enemy and strategy are changing.
Artículo de Graham E. Fuller en “Los Angeles Times” del 21.08.2003
Graham E. Fuller is former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA and author of the book "The Future of Political Islam" (Palgrave, 2003).
The shocking attack against U.N.
headquarters in Baghdad that took the life of the head of the U.N. mission
there, among many others, represents not only an escalation of the violence in
Baghdad but a sharp change in the character of the anti-U.S. insurgency.
Despite past administration rhetoric that suggested the bulk of the insurgency
and attacks had come from former elites around Saddam Hussein, it is
increasingly clear that a variety of groups is involved in this campaign.
Furthermore, the shift of the insurgency in recent weeks to take on non-American
targets suggests perhaps new players and even a new strategy that might end up
alienating the Iraqi public itself.
The one thing that unites all insurgents in Iraq is their desire to rid
themselves of the U.S. occupation as soon as possible. They have a mixture of
motives: revenge on the part of the Baath Party elite for the war that destroyed
them; and Iraqi frustration and anger at the slow progress of postwar
reconstruction, aggravated by the fact the U.S. is largely alone in the process.
The guerrilla attacks also attract other Iraqis who have no love for Hussein but
who feel humiliated by defeat and occupation and want the Americans out
yesterday. And finally, the occupation attracts all those radicals across the
region simply looking for a chance to kill Americans to make up for past
grievances, both real and imagined.
But the violence has now moved beyond strictly American targets to take on all
those supporting the U.S. in any capacity — witness the killing of other allied
soldiers, the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy and now the U.N. headquarters.
Is this tactic smart, even for the most radical guerrilla faction? Although many
Iraqis are quite capable of being both anti-Hussein and anti-American at the
same time, most Iraqis do not want to see progress toward restoration of the
infrastructure sabotaged. Attacks against the Iraqi oil pipeline to Turkey and
water pipes to civilian areas are not helping the Iraqi public by any measure.
If most Iraqis don't like Americans, the United Nations surely could deliver
services that are less "tainted" than those provided by American occupation
personnel. The chances are that the radical guerrillas and terrorists
responsible for the recent attacks may provoke a public backlash against all the
insurgents.
Indeed, what should the insurgents' rationale now be? Is it better to attack
only Americans — emphasizing that Washington is the occupier and primary enemy?
Or all foreigners? After all, attacks against even non-American forces may now
simply encourage much of the rest of the world to fight the insurgents in Iraq.
The ultra-radicals may calculate that they can drive everyone out and leave Iraq
free of foreigners, in chaos and without much aid, poisoning the well for all.
Few Iraqis want that. But that was really the war Hussein always wanted to fight
— not a high-tech war from 50,000 feet but one fought down in the trenches and
in the cities, where attacker and attacked are on more equal terms.
The sad part is that even if the "silent majority" of the Iraqis want the U.S.
to restore much of the infrastructure and establish some nascent national
institutions before it leaves, they may not have a say in it.
Guerrilla forces always seek to polarize civilian populations — you are either
with us or with the enemy — and they surely wish to warn off other U.S. allies.
Moderate elements, such as the Iraqi Shiites, have so far refrained from the use
of violence against the United States, even while waiting for the U.S. to depart
so they can assert their majoritarian power over the state.
But if fighting and violence are going to be the order of the day, can the
Shiites, especially the more radical elements, afford to sit out the struggle
against occupation? Are Arab Sunnis now seeking to adopt a mantle of legitimacy,
heroism and nationalism in making up the chief force of resistance in the
country? Such a tactic raises the stakes all around.
The chances are that we are now witnessing multiple and competing insurgent
agendas. With luck, the nihilists — those striking at all forces linked with the
U.S. or the West in any way — will now be discredited by violence that
ultimately hurts Iraq.
The clock is ticking in Iraq for Washington to demonstrate that the occupation
is both productive and soon to end — or else it will play into the hands of the
increasingly ruthless insurgency forces that don't want to give Iraqis any
choice.