WHAT COMES NEXT? HOW TO LEAVE IRAQ WITH OUR HEADS HIGH
Artículo de Leslie H. Gelb en Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2004
Por
su interés y relevancia, he seleccionado el artículo que sigue para incluirlo
en este sitio web. (L. B.-B.)
Con un muy breve comentario al final, a ampliar en días
posteriores:
POR AHI PARECE QUE PODRIAN IR BIEN LAS COSAS (L. B.-B.,
23-5-04, 09:00)
The strategic tide in Iraq is turning inexorably against us. Now,
insurgents challenge our forces openly by occupying cities. Now, our legitimate
moral high ground totters under the shock of Americans pictured abusing Iraqi
prisoners. As the June "transfer" of political sovereignty to Iraqis
nears, it reeks of improvisation and illegitimacy. Now, coalition partners
murmur about extracting even their small forces. Now, a huge majority of Iraqis
sees us as occupiers and wants us out, despite many knowing the good we do.
Stunningly, last week, Chairman of Joint Chiefs Richard Myers, with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at his side, said:
"There is no way to militarily lose in Iraq. There is also no way to
militarily win in Iraq."
No one of goodwill or good sense would or should want the United States
to lose. For all our errors and shortcomings, America remains the only center, the only hope, in the world-wide struggle against
terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
To leave Iraq with our heads high and our power intact, we need a new
strategy. President Bush's present strategy-maximum ends with limited means,
tossing political responsibility to the United Nations, no plausible exit plan,
and prayer-will not allow us to prevail, or leave.
The new strategy has to begin with a hard-headed rethinking of U.S.
interests and goals. That means descending from the dreams of Iraqi democracy
to the nightmares of Iraqi history and politics and of regional rivalries. It
will require a relentless focus on a political solution. And to buy ourselves
the political support necessary to carry out this new strategy, we will have to
set a date certain for our military departure, say two years. It is critical
for all to see that we will not remain occupiers. If we do less, demands will
sprout irresistibly for a quick American withdrawal regardless of consequences.
Ousting Saddam was essential to our national security. We can argue
about Mr. Bush's unsuccessful gathering of international backing for the war or
his careless postwar planning or Saddam's disposing
somehow of his weapons of mass destruction. But to me, he was clearly a serious
threat to his neighbors and to us.
But it is by no means critical for us to build Iraq once again into a
strong unitary state with a strong central government in Baghdad. Recent
history shows that Iraq, given its powerful ethnic and religious divergences,
can be ruled from Baghdad only by massive and brutal force. We have no interest
in exercising that kind of force, nor in seeing anyone
else do so. Nor would Iraq's neighbors rejoice in the
rebirth of a strong Iraq.
As for transforming Iraq into a democratic, free-market paradise, that's
more frosting on a cake that hasn't been baked than it is a core U.S. interest.
It took over 200 years for the United States to reach its current state of
perfection. We might at least give Iraq and other Arab states a generation or
two. Democracy requires that losers of elections believe they will not lose
their essential values or their lives. Such trust and confidence takes decades
to develop. It is Utopian to believe otherwise. It is dangerous as well because
it makes our commitment open-ended, and thus
unacceptable in America and Iraq. If Mr. Bush clings to this goal, he will
continue to drain our blood and treasure, and still fail.
But our interests and our sacrifices do impel us to put Iraq plausibly
on the path to democracy. We can secure this interest best by protecting
minority interests throughout Iraq. Minority rights are the foundation of
democracy and a bulwark against violence. The so-called general elections
solution, without minority rights and without a political deal will produce a
Shiite majority, with Shiite religious laws, and thus provoke civil war. The
only other core interest we have is to ensure that Iraq does not become a power
vacuum. Otherwise, greedy or worried neighbors will
pick off pieces and set off a Gulf-wide war, perhaps even with weapons of mass
destruction.
Thus, our core interests--protecting minority rights and avoiding Iraq
becoming a tempting target--are limited and achievable. On such a base, a new
strategy can be mounted. The strategy proceeds from the notion that our
problems in Iraq are far more political than military. We have been trying to
use force to solve political problems, and that never works.
Thus, step one is to begin cutting a political deal. That deal must be
based upon the fundamental political reality of Iraq: that none of the three
largest ethnic/religious groups-Arab Shiites, Arab Sunnis and Kurds-will allow
itself to be dominated by the others. Each will fight if its core interests are
jeopardized.
The only arrangement that might satisfy all three groups is a loose
federation with three largely self-governing regions and a relatively weak
central government. The central government would oversee border defense, sharing of oil revenues and matters such as
health. Thus, and paradoxically, the only way to keep Iraq whole is to allow
maximum autonomy to its constituent parts.
The Shiites won't be happy with this idea. The Bush administration
promised them countrywide democratic elections, and, with a majority of Iraq's
population, they now want to run the whole show. They will insist on this form
of democracy-unless and until they understand their real choice: endless and
fruitless warfare with Sunnis and Kurds, who will never tolerate Shiite rule,
as opposed to being left to run their own affairs in southern Iraq.
Sunnis also will resist. Many still harbor
illusions about resuming their historic role as masters of Mesopotamia. Sunni
warriors and bureaucrats of old sold themselves to the Ottomans and British as
swords and civil servants. So, today, Sunni generals in Fallujah offer
themselves to Americans as reliable pacifiers of insurgents. But Sunnis must be
pressed to see their real future choice: continuing their quest for dominance
and being denied their share of Iraq's considerable oil wealth (which lies
almost exclusively in the Kurdish north and Shiite south); or peacefully
playing to their civil-service strengths and sharing the oil wealth. Americans,
Shiites and Kurds can provide incentives, positive and negative, for the right
decision.
The Kurds will celebrate the retention of the regional autonomy they've
enjoyed these last 13 years. In that time, they've made good headway toward
democracy and a market economy.
The federation/autonomy solution can be maneuvered
through the procedures already agreed upon by the U.S. and the U.N. In other
words, let's work with willing Iraqis to plant the idea with the interim
government, projected for June, to embody federalism in the constituent
assembly set to follow, and then gear the general elections scheduled after
that to conform to "federal democracy."
First, this would mean holding elections in the three regions, with the
resulting three regional governments then sending representatives to the
national government in Baghdad on a proportional basis. What's our leverage to
do this? Essentially, it's telling the good Iraqis of all stripes: "You
have two years to use U.S. military and economic power to make this work . . .
or buy a flat in London." Moderate good guys are notoriously impossible to
fire up. But if this doesn't work, nothing will.
The second part of the new strategy is to focus almost all American
leverage on the protection of minority rights. To some extent, minorities in
the three regions will be protected by mutual deterrence: Hurt my people in
your region, and I'll hurt yours. We can reinforce this by tying our economic
aid directly and solely to protecting minority rights.
The third part of the new strategy is to make an all-out effort to share
the military burden during the two-year phaseout
period. If we have a political deal in process with a safer security
environment, those important peacekeepers might be forthcoming. Presumably,
we'd also have a U.N. imprimatur. Our only condition should be that a U.S.
general command all peacekeepers.
The fourth leg of the strategy is to launch a regional conference aimed
at nonintervention commitments. Specifically, all
parties would agree not to attack Iraq or supply arms and funds to Iraqi
insurgents. For their parts, the three Iraqi regions would pledge to protect
minorities and not establish independent states.
The U.S. should use this conference to announce the timetable for its
military withdrawal from Iraq. This will assure the parties that the end of
American occupation is near. It will also foster support in America for keeping
U.S. forces in place until essential interests are secured. Although the U.S.
leverage and common sense arguments in this strategy are not overwhelming and
are debatable, they may be the best we have at this point. Not debatable is
that we must have a coherent and plausible strategy or we will lose.
America today is a house politically divided against itself.
And the American house is increasingly derided by too many around the world.
Iraq aggravates the nastiness enormously. We can help lance the nastiness by
letting all know that the U.S. presence in Iraq will end soon and well: Soon,
meaning within two years, to blunt pressure for precipitate withdrawal and
allow time for diplomacy. Well, because all must see that we helped make Iraq a
better and safer place, and that the bitterly questioned sacrifices of war
possessed value.
Mr. Gelb is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations
MUY BREVE COMENTARIO: POR
AHI PARECE QUE PODRIAN IR BIEN LAS COSAS (L. B.-B., 23-5-04, 09:00)
Estamos comprobando día a
día el deterioro de la situación de la seguridad y de la legitimidad en Irak:
parece que el "¡vivan las caenas!" de
algunos sectores iraquíes tiene arraigo, así que es necesario inclinarse como
la rama de junco, pero redirigiendo nuestros objetivos y los suyos en la
dirección correcta para el desarrollo de la libertad. Por eso, las ideas
expuestas por Gelb me parecen muy fecundas, y creo
que por ahí deberían ir las cosas. Pero añadiría algo más: ¿no les parece que
sería más factible ir construyendo la libertad poco a poco, en cada una de las
tres zonas territoriales de Irak, según el ritmo y con el apoyo de los
protagonistas que sea preciso en cada una de ellas? ¿No les parece que en el
territorio kurdo se podría avanzar mucho más rápidamente que en el resto? ¿No
les parece que sería posible también comenzar el proceso para convocar unas
elecciones relativamente pronto en territorio chií? ¿No les parece que podría
eso constituir en conjunto un estímulo positivo para los sunníes?
¿No les parece que permitiría acelerar el proceso de cristalización de fuerzas
favorables a la libertad allí?
En síntesis: acelerar
donde se pueda y frenar donde no se pueda avanzar, preocupándose, al mismo
tiempo, de mantener articulado el conjunto con instituciones provisionales y el
apoyo y sostén de la coalición y actores internacionales. Algunas de las
ideas del "International Crisis Group", desde esta perspectiva, podrían ser
útiles, pero basando la estrategia fundamentalmente en las ideas de Gelb. Es decir, atemperar temporalmente los grandes
objetivos de democracia, permitiendo que se ponga en marcha un proceso más
lento para que cuaje establemente, contemplando la sectorialización estratégica
del Irak en zonas, pero preocupándose de mantener integrado el conjunto, por
ejemplo con una Presidencia similar a la prevista en la Constitución
transicional. Y todo ello, aunque sea preciso suspender temporalmente los
derechos en la zona sunní, y encomendar su gobierno
provisionalmente a alguien con suficiente fuerza para mantener el orden y la
seguridad y enfrentarse al terrorismo de Al Qaeda.
Perfilemos las ideas un
poco más: con el proceso avanzando y consolidándose en el norte y el sur, con
una presidencia provisional tripartita para mantener integrado el conjunto y
canalizar el proceso global, podrían llegar a definirse autoridades
democráticas kurdas y chiíes, que compartieran con algún sunní
el poder hasta que cuaje en territorio sunní una
situación más estable y un mosaico de fuerzas políticas que comiencen a
impulsar el cambio allí.
Todo esto me sale un poco
desordenado, pero no dispongo de tiempo en estos momentos para elaborarlo más.
Lo intentaré la próxima semana.