F. Andy Messing Jr.,
Por su interés y relevancia, he seleccionado el artículo que sigue para incluirlo en este sitio web. (L. B.-B.)
There will be nothing irregular or special about terrorism and insurgent warfare
in the 21st century.
Nuclear deterrents and firm identities make full-scale war between developed
nations unlikely. Meanwhile, the regions most likely to boil into chaos lack
economic, military, political and social unity. Comparatively weak, potential
foes turn to asymmetrical combat: hiding among civilians, attacking only
weakness and conducting psychological and cyber warfare.
Contrastingly, American policy continues to focus on glitzy technology and
high-end destructive capability. While the Air Force spends $200 billion
developing the Joint Strike Fighter for conflict against an imagined future
superpower, existing low-tech enemies display far greater fear of decades-old
AC-130 gunships and low-cost Special Forces. Misplaced priorities and their
associated weight are merely first in a long line of problems endangering the
nation's security.
America faces a wide range of threats using a narrow set of inappropriate
tools. Nuclear terrorism, small arms proliferation and the continually
smoldering conflicts of the Third World are only three of many new dangers
constantly taking new forms.
Against this rising tide, America seems content with its two traditional
policies: diplomacy and conventional warfare. This rigid mindset, however,
ignores resourceful methods for discreetly applying force.
America must engage the many emerging threats without sapping its strength.
An evolving strategy must use information, creativity and careful planning to
achieve victory without battle. Full-spectrum security will require expanded
human intelligence to gauge enemy intentions, a revived covert operations
program to undermine and discredit opponents, and even-better trained special
operations forces (SOF) for counterterrorism and regime change.
In effect, American policy must segue into a form of futuristic "gladiator
warfare," which could reduce total turmoil.
In the Cold War, America regularly engaged intelligence sources and
exfiltrated defectors to safety. However, pinpointing and tracking potential
enemies has become more difficult while the need for human intelligence has
skyrocketed. Where conventional intelligence networks are mostly ineffective,
more ingenious solutions are needed. Bounties for information on threatening
individuals may prove more efficient than direct pursuit. A global
whistleblowers policy, for scientists, military officers and government
officials knowing of their governments' heinous conduct or clandestine programs,
should offer safety and a new life to those with reliable information.
In the long term, America will need to creatively expand intelligence
contacts and improve regional specialists to engage the diverse cultures from
which it needs cooperation.
Intelligence
operatives must also regain permission to act pre-emptively on immediate
information. These covert operations capabilities, removed from the CIA under
President Carter, should be carefully reinstated. Low-profile missions, such as
select psychological warfare campaigns and sabotage against weapons programs,
can divert imminent threats.
Working for longer-term solutions, limited resources creatively applied can
yield enormous benefits. In El Salvador, patient ambassadors and a core of 55
SOF soldiers helped win the country back from the forces of communism and drug
activity. American aid guided the government toward responsibility and respect
for human rights.
Now a similar struggle in Central Asia, where governments turn to
authoritarianism to retain control, demands a similar solution. SOF engagement
in military training and counterterror operations could reduce immediate
security pressures while encouraging governments to gradually democratize to win
public support. This long-term, low-footprint cooperation forms the core of a
successful anti-terror strategy.
Even when faster results are needed, SOF remain cheaper and more effective
than conventional military options. Regime change will continue as a necessary
if unpopular tool in fighting advanced-stage weapons programs.
SOF, however, can act with appreciably lower visibility and political risk.
Regime change through occupation causes difficulty solving political, economic,
and social conflict in purely military terms, often destroying the institutions
that bind citizens together. Irregular warriors approach the problem from a
different angle: exploiting existing instability to nurture revolutionary
movements; attacking surgically to induce the enemy's collapse; and having so
small a footprint as to avoid post-victory administration and reconstruction,
leaving intact the sentiment of popular revolution so useful in cementing
national identity. A small number of American SOF advisers can win the war and
remain popular long enough to win the peace.
The ancient Chinese philosopher-general Sun Tzu wrote, "Indirect tactics,
efficiently applied, are as inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth." While direct
tactics, poorly applied, begin to exhaust America's might, the nation needs to
find new tools to give leaders greater flexibility to act early and often
against potential dangers. America has the resolve to fight its enemies, but it
must gain the wisdom to do so creatively.
F. Andy Messing Jr., retired major in the U.S. Special Forces, is
executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation in
Alexandria.
Adam Solove is NDCF senior research
assistant.