AMERICA ADRIFT IN IRAQ

 Editorial de  “The New York Times” del 15/05/2004

Por su interés y relevancia, he seleccionado el artículo que sigue para incluirlo en este sitio web. (L. B.-B.)

Six weeks of military and political reverses seem to have left the Bush administration doing little more in Iraq than grasping at ways to make it past November's presidential election without getting American troops caught in a civil war. The lowering of the administration's expectations might be therapeutic if it produced a realistic strategy for achieving a realistic set of goals. Unfortunately, there appears to be no such strategy, only odd lurches this way and that under the pressure of day-to-day events. That pattern heightens the danger of an eventual civil war or anarchy, the two main things that American forces are ostensibly remaining in Iraq to prevent.

At times, the only unifying theme for Washington's policies seems to be desperation. American field commanders have now signed over the city of Falluja to former officers of the same Baathist army they came to Iraq to fight a little more than a year ago. The original plan of having American marines storm Falluja to avenge the mob murders of four private contractors there was not a wise idea. Handing over the town to these politically ambitious soldiers looks even more shortsighted. Subcontracting security and territory out to rival Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish warlords can only increase the risks of an eventual civil war.

In the diplomatic arena, White House aides are now beseeching the same United Nations they once belittled to rescue the transition, hoping that its special emissary, Lakhdar Brahimi, can somehow produce a plan for an interim government after June 30 that will rescue the nation-building efforts American occupation authorities have badly botched. This could be a positive development. If President Bush is now prepared to yield real authority to the U.N. over transition arrangements, for example, it may create a sense of legitimacy that Washington itself is no longer in any position to bestow. But at this point it may be beyond the U.N.'s power to convince a skeptical world that Iraq will regain any meaningful sovereignty after June 30 if the real decisions on security and reconstruction are still made by Americans.

Members of the discredited, American-appointed Iraqi Governing Council are maneuvering to ensure a share of power for themselves after the council is dissolved next month. This is a terrible idea, linking the new interim government to the occupation regime and prejudicing future elections by giving council members an unfair inside track. Yet the administration seems to be wavering, reluctant to upset the transition timetable by antagonizing any of its few remaining Iraqi allies.

If any of the goals Americans wanted to achieve in Iraq can still be salvaged, it will take more than fumbling crisis management driven by the needs of the Bush re-election campaign. A clear and coherent new course needs to be set without further delay, beginning with aggressive policy and personnel changes to undo the damage of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The U.N. should be given clear authority over transitional political arrangements after June 30, with Washington fully backing Mr. Brahimi's efforts to assemble a caretaker government of credible Iraqis who are not associated with the occupation and are willing to put aside their own political ambitions.

Important constitutional and political decisions should be deferred until elections can be held, but the interim government should assume administrative control over oil revenues and economic reconstruction projects and exercise sovereign authority over the Iraqi police and the courts. And if, as is now generally assumed, it consents to the continued presence of American occupation forces, it will also have to work out a new relationship with these troops, who will remain accountable to Washington, not Baghdad. This will go more smoothly if the administration stops subcontracting security to former Iraqi warlords and private companies and makes sure that all American troops are properly trained for the tasks assigned to them.

In the short run, replacing these proxies will probably require sending more troops, or delaying scheduled rotations out of Iraq. But over time, if the administration is finally ready to accept international oversight and a real measure of Iraqi sovereignty, Americans may see a reduction of violence and increased peacekeeping help from other nations. With June 30 rapidly approaching, Washington will soon have to choose its course.