BEYOND 'NATION-BUILDING'

  Artículo de Donald H. Rumsfeld en “The Washington Post” del 25.09.2003

Two weeks into Operation Iraqi Freedom, a number of newspapers and many airwaves were filled with prognosticators declaring the war plan a failure. The United States, they said, did not do enough to build international support, did not properly anticipate the level of resistance by Iraqis, and failed to send enough forces to do the job.

Then coalition forces took Baghdad in 21 days. Today Gen. Tom Franks's innovative and flexible war plan, which so many dismissed as a failure, is being studied by military historians and taught in war colleges.

Today in Iraq, an innovative plan is also being implemented in our effort to win the peace. And it should come as no surprise that we are again hearing suggestions as to why the postwar effort is on the brink of failure.

It will take longer than 21 days, but I believe that the plan to win the peace in Iraq will succeed -- just as the plan to win the war succeeded.

Why did some predict failure in the first weeks of the war? One reason, I suspect, is that Gen. Franks's plan was different and unfamiliar -- in short, not what was expected. And because it didn't fit into the template of general expectations, many assumed at the first setback that the underlying strategy had to be flawed. It wasn't. Setbacks were expected, and the plan was designed to be flexible so our forces could deal with surprise. The coalition forces did so exceedingly well.

I believe the same will be true of the effort in Iraq today. Once again, what the coalition is doing is unfamiliar and different from many past "nation-building" efforts. So, when the coalition faces the inevitable surprises and setbacks, the assumption is that the underlying strategy is failing. I do not believe that is the case. To the contrary, despite real dangers, I believe that the new approach being taken by Gen. John Abizaid and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer will succeed and that success will have an important impact, not just on the future of Iraq but also on future international efforts to help struggling nations recover from war and regain self-reliance.

Today in Iraq we are operating on the same guiding principle that has brought success to our effort in Afghanistan: Iraq and Afghanistan belong to the Iraqi and Afghan peoples -- the United States does not aspire to own or run those countries.

During the war in Afghanistan, this philosophy helped shape the military campaign. Instead of sending a massive invasion force, we kept the coalition footprint modest and adopted a strategy of teaming with local Afghan forces that opposed the Taliban. The use of precision-guided weapons and the immediate delivery of humanitarian relief sent the message that we were coming as a force of liberation. And after the major fighting ended, we did not flood Afghanistan with Americans but rather worked with Afghans to establish an interim government and an Afghan national army. In Iraq the military challenge was notably different. No force of Iraqi fighters could have toppled the Saddam Hussein regime without significant numbers of coalition forces -- though in the north, Special Operations forces and Kurdish pesh merga fighters did tie down Hussein's northern units and liberate Mosul. Even so, we did not flood the country with a half-million U.S. troops. We kept our footprint modest, liberating Iraq with a little more than 100,000 U.S. troops on the ground. The use of precision weapons allowed us to save innocent lives and make clear that this was a war against a regime, not a people. And when major combat operations ended, we began working immediately to enlist Iraqis to take responsibility for governance and security.

We have made solid progress: Within two months, all major Iraqi cities and most towns had municipal councils -- something that took eight months in postwar Germany. Within four months the Iraqi Governing Council had appointed a cabinet -- something that took 14 months in Germany. An independent Iraqi Central Bank was established and a new currency announced in just two months -- accomplishments that took three years in postwar Germany. Within two months a new Iraqi police force was conducting joint patrols with coalition forces. Within three months, we had begun training a new Iraqi army -- and today some 56,000 are participating in the defense of their country. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in Germany and 10 years to begin training a new German army.

Why is enlisting Iraqis in security and governance so important?

Because it is their country. We are not in Iraq to engage in nation-building -- our mission is to help Iraqis so that they can build their own nation. That is an important distinction.

A foreign presence in any country is unnatural. It is much like a broken bone. If it's not set properly at the outset, the muscles and tendons will grow around the break, and eventually the body will adjust to the abnormal condition. This is what has happened in some past nation-building exercises. Well-intentioned foreigners arrive on the scene, look at the problems, and say, "Let's go fix it for them." Despite the good intentions and efforts of the international workers, there can be unintended adverse side effects. Because when foreigners come in with solutions to local problems, it can create dependency. Economies can remain unreformed, distorted and dependent. In some instances, educated young people make more money as drivers for international workers than as doctors or civil servants.

For example, East Timor is one of the poorest countries in Asia, yet the capital is now one of the most expensive cities in Asia. Local restaurants are out of reach for most Timorese and cater to international workers, who are paid 200 times the average local wage. At the city's main supermarket, prices are reportedly on par with those in London and New York.

Or take Kosovo. A driver shuttling international workers around the capital earns 10 times the salary of a university professor, and the U.N. administration pays its local staff between four and 10 times the salary of doctors and nurses. Four years after the war, the United Nations still runs Kosovo by executive fiat, issuing postage stamps, passports and driver's licenses. Decisions made by the local elected parliament are invalid without the signature of the U.N. administrator. And still, to this day, Kosovar ministers have U.N. overseers with the power to approve or disapprove their decisions.

Our objective is not to create dependency but to encourage Iraqi independence, by giving Iraqis increasing responsibility, over time, for the security and governance of their country. Because long-term stability comes not from the presence of foreign forces but from the development of functioning local institutions. The sooner Iraqis can take responsibility for their own affairs the sooner U.S. forces can come home.

That is why the coalition has been recruiting Iraqis to help defend Iraq, why municipal councils have been formed in 90 percent of the country and why the Iraqi Governing Council is taking charge of developing the 2004 budget and creating a process for the drafting of a new constitution, written by Iraqis, so that the Iraqi people can eventually choose their leaders in free elections -- and we can achieve an orderly transfer of full sovereignty.

Coalition efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan are bearing fruit.

Afghanistan is on the path to stability and self-government -- transformed from a safe haven for terrorism to an important U.S. ally, not just in the war against terror but also in the larger struggle for freedom and moderation in the Muslim world.

In Iraq the regime is gone, and Iraqis are stepping forward to take responsibility for their country. They are serving local, regional and national governing institutions, signing up to serve as police, border guards, soldiers and civil defense forces, starting businesses, creating jobs and building a new nation from the rubble of Saddam Hussein's tyranny.

This is not to underestimate the challenges in Iraq today. Terrorists and regime remnants want to roll back our successes and stop the Iraqi people's transition to democracy and self-government. We can expect they will continue to attack our successes, and the brave Iraqis who work with us, for some time. But coalition forces are dealing with the threat. And the security situation is improving.

Indeed, we may find that the biggest threat in Iraq comes not from terrorists and regime remnants but from the physical and psychological effects of three decades of Stalinist oppression. But Iraq also has a number of advantages -- oil wealth, water and an elaborate system of irrigation canals, vast wheat and barley fields, biblical sites and the potential for tourism, and an educated, urban population.

But to help Iraqis succeed, we must proceed with some humility. American forces can do many remarkable things, but they cannot provide permanent stability or create an Iraqi democracy. That will be up to the Iraqi people.

The work in Iraq is difficult, costly and dangerous. But it is worth the risks and the costs, because if the coalition succeeds, Iraqis will take hold of their country, develop the institutions of self-government and reclaim their nation's place as a responsible member of the international community. If we succeed, we will deal terrorism a powerful blow, because a democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East would be a defeat for the ideology of terror that is seeking to take control of that area of the world.

It will take patience, but if we are steadfast, Iraq can become a model for a successful transition from tyranny to democracy and self-reliance, and a friend and ally of the United States and the world's free and peace-loving nations. A few months ago, that statement would have seemed fanciful to many. Today, it is a goal within reach. But only if we help Iraqis build their nation, instead of trying to do it for them -- and have the wisdom to know the difference.

The writer is U.S. secretary of defense.