Artículo de Richard Hart Sinnreich en “The Washington Post” del 22/08/2004
Por su interés y
relevancia, he seleccionado el artículo que sigue para incluirlo en este sitio
web. (L. B.-B.)
Con un muy breve comentario al final:
AL SAD´R Y EL ARTE DEL TOREO (L. B.-B., 22-8-04, 11:00)
Watching the gallant but doomed charge of
the British light cavalry brigade against the Russian guns at Balaclava during
the Crimean War, French Gen. Pierre Bosquet commented
acidly, "It's magnificent, but it isn't war." The same might be said
of recent military operations in Iraq.
Observing them, Americans might be
pardoned for wondering just what we think we're doing. One week our troops are
clearing Fallujah of Baathist insurgents. The next
week they aren't. A month later they're clearing Najaf of Shiite insur- gents. Then, a few days later, they aren't.
Meanwhile, casualties and insurgents alike multiply.
Somewhere behind all this, there must be
some coherent strategic intention, but for most of us it isn't easily visible.
As far as we are able to judge, the war in Iraq has become a sort of military
perpetual motion machine, producing plenty of activity but not much evidence of
progress.
On Iraq's borders, infiltration persists
apparently unchecked. In the heartland, the only month-to-month change seems to
be which town or city will erupt in rebellion next. In the meantime, even
Iraqis who heartily detest each other are daily more unanimous in detesting our
continued presence.
Not long ago, preparing for a history
workshop, I found myself rereading U.S. Grant's "Personal Memoirs,"
widely regarded as among the finest such recollections ever penned by a
professional soldier. Reviewing his account of his army's operations in
Tennessee and Mississippi, I was struck by the change they gradually wrought in
Grant's attitude and that of his troops.
General and soldiers alike were products
of the mid-19th century, with a view of war shaped by the formalistic conflicts
of the recent past. Grant himself at the outset of the war expected it to end
with a few decisive battles. The issues in dispute having been tried on the
battlefield, the loser would accept the verdict and make peace.
In the West, however, the war didn't go that
way. Instead, enflamed by widespread popular resistance in the areas occupied
by Federal troops, it took on a character few on either side had foreseen. It
became what it had to be if the rebellion was to be defeated: a war against
Southern society, not just its soldiers.
Not all leaders on either side recognized
and accepted the change. Grant did. "He had no liking at all for the cruel
weight which modern warfare puts on the civilian," wrote one of his
biographers, "but he could order the weight applied without the slightest
hesitation when it seemed to him to be necessary." Fortunately, in Abraham
Lincoln, he had a president who not only shared his commitment to victory but
also accepted the moral cost of achieving it.
There are indications that a similar hard
realism is beginning to imbue soldiers and leaders in Iraq, but little evidence
so far that it has percolated up to their political masters. In an interview
earlier this month, multinational corps commander Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz
admitted, "As much as I would love the Iraqis to love me, and my doctrine
tells me I want to win the hearts and minds, I know I'm not going to do
that."
He's right. But few of his superiors seem
to have accepted that reality.
Rather, as recent events in Najaf reveal,
military operations in Iraq continue to fall between two levels, destructive
enough to provoke Iraqi resistance but not ruthless enough to suppress it.
Instead, we continue to play at making
war, sacrificing both our own and Iraqi lives to the so-far-vain hope that
military self-restraint will promote civility among people who historically
have evinced little even among themselves.
There's no future in that, no more than
there was in the invaded South of 1862. On the contrary, if it proved so
difficult then to subdue a society that, however rebellious, at least shared
the language and religious heritage of its invaders, why should we expect to
succeed more gently in pacifying one even less predisposed by history, culture
and religion to be tractable?
Not all our commanders need be U.S.
Grants nor all our presidents Abraham Lincolns. But we
can and should expect their successors to recognize and adapt to the
unmistakable evidence of the battlefield. Above all, that means dealing with
Iraqis as they are, not as we wish they were.
Nor is it any excuse that operations in
Iraq must be framed to avoid antagonizing Muslims elsewhere. They're already
antagonized. However much, like Metz, we might wish them to love us, it's far more essential to our own safety that they be
compelled to respect us.
But respect requires them to believe that
we are serious as well as sincere. And, just as it did for Grant, in what
clearly also is a conflict of societies, seriousness requires using war's
"cruel weight" in a way that makes continued resistance intolerable,
not just unpleasant.
In Iraq today our leaders are sincere,
but on current evidence they're not serious. Our troops and the Iraqis
themselves are paying the price. It may or may not be magnificent, but it
certainly isn't war.
Richard Hart Sinnreich
writes on military affairs for the Lawton (Okla.) Sunday Constitution.
Muy breve comentario:
AL SAD´R Y EL ARTE DEL TOREO
(L. B.-B., 22-8-04, 11:00)
Este pájaro loco le está tomando el pelo a todo el mundo.
Literalmente, a todo el mundo. Y si no miren las bolsas y el precio del
petróleo. ¿No les parece que ya es hora de acabar? ¿Es que la policía iraquí o
los helicópteros norteamericanos no están equipados con gases para
desalojar un edificio, por muy grande que sea?
Allawi parecía mantener una
postura correcta días atrás, dispuesto a hacer valer la autoridad del Gobierno
por encima de todo, pero después se puso a negociar con este clérigo demente y
corre el riesgo de perder la partida. La democracia, para poder consolidarse,
necesita respeto a la ley y al Gobierno, y no el toreo permanente.
Y con los sunníes rebeldes sucede algo
parecido: ¿es que todavía no funciona la inteligencia iraquí, para detectar los
grupos rebeldes y desarticularlos con contundencia? Acaben con el mayor número
posible de ellos, si no quieren que la transición se vaya al garete.
Es mejor que la transición se eche a perder por fortaleza que por
debilidad: el resultado será un país unido bajo una semidictadura,
antes que un país en guerra civil en manos de radicales islámicos, ayatolás
iraníes, ex baazistas y terroristas de Al
Qaeda.