THE POSTWAR DILEMMA

 Editorial de  “The Washington Post” del 27.04.2003

TWO CONTRADICTORY lessons are emerging from the initial experiences of American forces in postwar Iraq. Officials concerned with restoring Iraqi infrastructure, services and government have quickly realized that they face humbling challenges, and that reaching the goal of a stable Iraq under a democratic regime may take a few years to accomplish. In the cities, meanwhile, U.S. commanders and troops are learning that Iraqi patience for a U.S. presence may quickly be exhausted, meaning that a longer occupation will risk mounting resistance. So far the Bush administration has reacted to this conundrum by accelerating work on a political transition to a frantic pace: The occupation chief, Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, now plans to establish a temporary administration by the end of this week, and White House officials aim to create a more formal Iraqi Interim Authority in a month. Yet it's telling that the haste has been welcomed by the pro-Iranian clerics and neighboring Arab dictators who most oppose secular democracy in Iraq. Like the reconstruction experts, they know that a half-baked transition will minimize the chances for any liberal government to take hold.

There's no easy way to sustain the postwar operation long enough to make a representative government more likely, but the most proven approach is to make Iraqi reconstruction a multilateral project, backed by the United Nations. European and Arab governments are ready to supply funds, peacekeeping troops or police to such an operation, thereby easing the burden on the United States. Even more important, a multinational operation will diminish widespread Iraqi and Arab fears that the United States intends to make Iraq the equivalent of a colony. In Afghanistan the United States managed to exert decisive influence even while recruiting troops from many nations and allowing the United Nations to help form a government; it could do the same in Iraq. Moreover, President Bush publicly promised his closest war ally, Britain's Tony Blair, that he would seek a "partnership" or "vital role" for the United Nations.

So why the rush to carry out a transition that excludes the rest of the world? No coherent explanation has come from the administration -- in part because senior policymakers once again are quarreling among themselves. Some contend that that the quick march to Iraqi self-government will work fine, that all the United Nations need do is lift sanctions and get out of the way. Others say they envision a more substantial U.N. role -- but only if prewar adversaries France and Russia stop their anti-American maneuvering and agree to support the political process already underway. France's announcement last week that it would favor the suspension but not ending of U.N. sanctions, officials point out, was not very helpful: The French, like the Russians, still are trying to perpetuate U.N. control over Iraqi oil sales and insisting that a full lifting of sanctions be linked to certification by U.N. inspectors that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction -- which could take many months.

Weeks of thorny negotiations are now likely at the Security Council. It may be that France and Russia will choose obstructionism, leaving the United States no choice but to proceed on its own. But that outcome would be less likely if the Bush administration dropped its shortsighted plan to take punitive steps against France and agreed to modest cooperative measures that are clearly in the American interest. U.N. technical assistance could help any Iraqi transitional administration; the full participation of a designated U.N. representative in the selection of that government would improve its chances of gaining legitimacy and recruiting foreign aid and peacekeepers. Though there shouldn't be a link to sanctions, U.S. findings about weapons of mass destruction would have more credibility if confirmed by U.N. inspectors; for the same reason, there should be some international monitoring of how Iraq's oil earnings are used. Agreeing to such things wouldn't require the Bush administration to surrender much authority in postwar Iraq; the question is whether it will show any flexibility at all.