THE IRAQI RESISTANCE

 Editorial de  “The Washington Post” del 29.06.2003

At the beginning of this month, U.S. commanders in Iraq concluded that the war that a month earlier had been declared over really wasn't. Loose networks of Iraqi militants, many with ties to Saddam Hussein's deposed dictatorship, were trying to launch a guerrilla campaign, hoping to drive U.S. troops from Iraq and eventually restore the old regime. The American response was relatively strong: Thousands of Army troops scheduled to leave Iraq were instead deployed to what became known as the "Sunni triangle" northwest of Baghdad, and systematic sweeps were begun to root out the lingering resistance. Yet, as the month ends, the problem appears to be getting worse rather than better. By last week the number of incidents had risen to two dozen a day, and Iraqi ambushes were growing in effectiveness and range. At least six soldiers have been killed since Wednesday. The enemy also managed to cut off power and water in Baghdad with sabotage attacks and killed several Iraqi civilians working to restore electricity.

So far the resistance doesn't appear to have weakened the Bush administration's resolve or congressional support for staying the course in Iraq. It shouldn't. But it ought to prompt a thorough review of whether the United States has sufficient troops, sufficient resources and sufficient allied help to overcome the challenge. Reports from the ground strongly suggest it does not. U.S. troops in the Sunni towns where support for Saddam Hussein was strongest say they are exhausted after months of fighting. In other parts of the country, where there is little or no resistance, American soldiers are nevertheless struggling to maintain order and restart normal economic activity, because they lack training, expertise or civilian help. The Pentagon says it is recruiting additional allied forces from countries such as India, Pakistan and Turkey, but political and logistical obstacles may postpone their arrival.

The administration's best course would be to reverse the error it made after the war, when it insisted on monopolizing control over postwar Iraq and minimizing the role of allies and the United Nations. U.N. agencies and European governments are well stocked with experts on such matters as infrastructure repair, agriculture, policing and judicial reform who could be recruited to help the thinly stretched American forces in the provinces. Provided the United States is willing to stop monopolizing reconstruction contracts for U.S. firms, more financial support could be obtained from rich nations, such as Germany, and the European Union. While forces from Muslim countries could help ease Iraqi resentment of the ongoing occupation, commanders also need troops who can effectively take on Iraqi commandos -- soldiers who could be supplied by France, provided the Pentagon is prepared to drop its feud with Paris. In Baghdad, the U.S. provisional authority could help by offering Iraqis a clear plan -- call it a "road map" -- for creating, in stages, a representative Iraqi government. Most Iraqis are still open to cooperating with an American-led transition to a new era in their country. But the Bush administration must move quickly to prove to them that that transformation will go forward -- and that those who oppose it will be defeated.