DUELING TIMELINES IN IRAQ

 Editorial de  “The Washington Post” del 24.08.2003

If a terrible week in the Middle East shook any of the complacency out of the Bush administration, there was little public evidence. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell traveled to United Nations headquarters to express condolences for the U.N. staffers killed in Tuesday's bombing in Baghdad and to seek more foreign contributions of troops to aid U.S. forces in Iraq. But he came without any stated willingness to do what would be needed to attract such contributions, that is, to share political authority over Iraq with the United Nations. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld continued to maintain that U.S. troop strength in Iraq is adequate. There was no talk of an accelerated effort of any kind to improve daily life for Iraqis.

The administration seems convinced that time is on its side in Iraq. It acknowledges grave problems but counsels patience. As "regime remnants" are captured or killed, officials say, Iraq will become safer and Iraqis will feel freer to work with U.S. authorities. Maybe that is right. Last week U.S. forces captured two of the highest-ranking and most odious figures from Saddam Hussein's regime, which suggests an encouraging level of intelligence cooperation with Iraqis. Even anti-U.S. newspapers in Iraq publish, if grudgingly, results of opinion surveys showing that most Iraqis are glad Saddam Hussein is gone and do not yet want U.S. forces to depart. In many parts of the country, local Iraqi councils are beginning to govern and Iraqi police are assuming authority.

But it seems at least equally plausible that time is working against the coalition. Many Iraqis already are surprised and disappointed by the meager results of the first months of U.S. rule. Meanwhile, Gen. John P. Abizaid said last week that terrorism "is emerging as the number one security threat." While U.S. soldiers continue to come under daily attack, targets also include Iraqis who cooperate with the United States, private contractors and, as the U.N. bombing showed, anyone else who is trying to improve conditions in Iraq. That attack set back reconstruction efforts in many ways, and the continuing threat of violence will slow progress toward rebuilding the nation's infrastructure. That in turn means many Iraqis will remain without electricity or water or, too often, employment -- which may encourage opposition to the occupation and thus further set back efforts to make Iraq more secure.

There's no magic solution for the challenges the United States faces in Iraq, but a key first step would be to face them honestly. Even before the war, we and many others urged the administration to level with Congress and the American people about the likely costs of postwar occupation. It failed to do so, perhaps, it now seems, because the administration itself harbored an unrealistic view. Has that changed? Last week, asked about the challenges of attracting more troops from countries that resent sole U.S. authority, Mr. Powell said, "I don't think there is a problem."

But there is a problem. There aren't enough troops, there aren't enough police and there aren't enough contributions from countries with competent militaries. In Karbala, a city in southern Iraq where occupation has been fairly successful, 1,000 Marines are about to withdraw in favor of 455 Bulgarian troops. But the Bulgarians have no intention of assuming the civil administration functions the Marines have been carrying out, as the Wall Street Journal reported Friday, and a civilian team that was supposed to deploy there hasn't even been named. Given the stakes, and the potential for new problems, this kind of ragged, improvised, resource-poor effort is inexcusable and incomprehensible.

"Opposition to the foreign occupation is becoming stronger and more violent," the International Crisis Group says in a report to be released tomorrow. The ICG, a private organization that conducts useful research in trouble spots around the world, recommends a new division of labor that would put the United Nations in charge of political transition while leaving the U.S.-led coalition in charge of security and the Iraqi Governing Council doing as much day-to-day administration as it can. Whether that precise formula is the right one can be debated. There shouldn't be any debate about the need for more intense effort and more openness to allied cooperation. The longer the administration delays, the greater the chances of failure.