WITHOUT A MAP

 Editorial de  “The Washington Post” del 09.09.2003

BUSH ADMINISTRATION officials seem to hope that they can avoid accepting the collapse of the latest Israeli-Palestinian peace process simply by declaring it still alive. "The road map is still there," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell insisted Sunday. "What are the alternatives?" Sadly, those alternatives are very real -- and hard-liners on both sides are rushing to demonstrate them. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat smugly presides over the selection of a new prime minister after forcing the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of Palestinian efforts to end violence and renew negotiations with Israel; Mr. Arafat believes his coup will compel Israel and the United States to deal with him once again. Israel, meanwhile, launches daily assassination operations against leaders of the extremist group Hamas; if the inevitable retaliatory suicide bombers succeed, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will again demand that the Bush administration agree to Israel's expulsion of Mr. Arafat, a step that could bring about the final collapse of the Palestinian Authority. After several months of relative calm, Israelis and Palestinians now face the prospect of another thunderous eruption of violence, one that will further complicate the Bush administration's effort to stabilize Iraq and build an international coalition in the Middle East.

Could the administration have avoided this reverse? Perhaps not. Though supported by President Bush in recent months, the "road map" may have been doomed from the beginning by the problem of Mr. Arafat. It is obvious that he will never renounce violence against Israel or agree to a final peace settlement with a Jewish state. And pro-peace Palestinian leaders such as Mr. Abbas are not yet strong enough to sideline him. Much of this summer's diplomacy was aimed at bolstering the Palestinian moderates -- but little was done. Rather than embrace the strategy, Mr. Sharon took only small steps, just enough to avoid trouble with Mr. Bush; once again Mr. Sharon failed to take any significant action against Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Mr. Abbas did little to encourage Israeli confidence in him. Though he forthrightly denounced terrorism, he shrank from the job of dismantling the terrorist cells of Hamas and other extremist groups. Instead, he lapsed into the familiar Palestinian strategy of demanding that Washington pressure Israel. Mr. Bush soon found himself thrust into the role of broker between Mr. Sharon and Mr. Abbas -- and he failed to budge either side. A U.S. monitoring team diligently compiled a weekly report on each side's noncompliance with the road map -- but the White House timidly declined to publicize it.

The administration seeks to salvage the situation by hinting that progress is still possible if the next Palestinian prime minister shares Mr. Abbas's agenda and succeeds in gaining control over Mr. Arafat's multiple security forces. The unlikelihood of this was underscored by the unrealistic conditions Mr. Arafat's latest choice sought to put on U.S. diplomacy yesterday. Progress could only be made if Mr. Arafat were induced by concerted international pressure to yield the power he just consolidated, and if Mr. Sharon were persuaded to suspend the all-out war against Hamas he just launched. If this is not possible, the Bush administration at least ought to draw a lesson from the summer's events: A successful peace process will require bolder and more forceful action than any of the parties -- including Mr. Bush -- have so far been willing to take.