DON’T RUSH TO DISASTER

  Artículo de Fareed Zacharia en “Newsweek” del 14-9-03

It is touching to learn of French faith in the Iraqi Governing Council. When the council was set up, the French refused to endorse it

Sept. 22 issue —  Finally everyone seems to agree on Iraq. The French and German governments have proposed that Iraq should be handed back to Iraqis as soon as possible. The Governing Council should become the government of Iraq and elections should be held by the end of the year. Some prominent Iraqis have spoken in favor of this proposal. U.N. officials have made statements supporting an accelerated transfer of power. Even some American politicians see this as a useful exit strategy. There’s only one problem. The notion of a quick transfer of power to Iraqis is impractical, unwise and dangerous.

IT IS STRANGE that U.N. officials argue that we must quickly move, in Kofi Annan’s phrase, from “the logic of occupation” to that of Iraqi sovereignty. The United Nations has blessed and assisted in the occupation of Bosnia, where it took seven years to transfer power to the locals. It boasts of “the logic of occupation” in Kosovo, which has gone smoothly for the past four years, with no prospect of ending any time soon. It administered tiny East Timor for two years before handing over power. Does Kofi Annan really think that what took seven years in Bosnia can take one year in Iraq, with six times as many people?
        It is touching to learn of the French faith in the Governing Council. When the council was set up, the French government (as well as the Germans) refused to endorse it, privately disparaging the group as American puppets. It took a month for the United States to get it to vote in the Security Council simply to welcome the formation of the council. France’s newfound love for the council is simply an attempt to get the United States out as soon as possible.
        The Governing Council is a vital part of the new Iraq. But there is simply no way it could become the government right now. It is a group of 25 disparate people, chosen to fulfill ethnic, religious and other quotas, that has never worked together. When asked to choose a chairman, it chose nine. Even if it functions well, the council will function best as a legislative body, not as an executive. You cannot have Iraq run by 25 coequal chiefs, especially during this crucial period of reform and restructuring.

When it needs anything ---money, security--- the Council has to turn to the Coalition. After the recent bomb blast in Najaf, the Coalition Provisional Authority condemned the attack, but then stepped back, explaining that the Governing Council was in charge. Several hours later, the council had not even issued a statement. "I think someone is writing up a statement, somebody, I´m not sure", a council member explained. "We don´t have satellite... The Americans should give us a satellite".

Iraq may not be a failed state, but is a highly dysfunctional one. It has been through three decades of totalitarian rule, three wars, 13 years of economic sanctions and massive internal repression. Its ministries are organized along Stalinist lines. Its people have been cowed into submission for decades. It will take some time to reform the Iraqui state and heal Iraqui political culture. An immediate transfer of  power will retard and perhaps even reverse this process of reform. New political leaders will seek to use the Iraqui state to consolidate their power, not limit its reach. That is what happened in Bosnia. Once elected, ethnid thugs didn´t want to build the rule of law; they wanted to use the law to stay in office.

A quick transfer to locals would also mean the end of American aid. The United States is planning to put at least $20 billion in Iraq this year— half the GDP of the country. Iraq has not had a published budget since 1979. Its ministries cannot spend $20 billion, let alone spend it well. There is no chance that the United States would keep the aid flowing if it went directly into such a system.
        And yet the United States must agree to some change in the political structure of the occupation, or else it will not get help it sorely needs. Even if a U.N. resolution passes, unless it is a strong resolution backed by important countries, it will not translate into troops and money. The solution might be to turn Paul Bremer into a U.N. official reporting to the Security Council. This would share the control of Iraq, yet maintain the structure of authority and the momentum for reform that has begun.
        Beyond troops and money, internationalization gives the occupation time. Bremer has outlined a seven-step process that would lead to the ratification of a constitution, and then elections, probably in two years. During that period, Iraq’s courts, police, Army and administration would be remade. This is a sensible path; indeed, it may itself be too rushed.
        Popular sovereignty is a great thing, but a constitutional process is greater still. The French know this. The French Revolution emphasized popular sovereignty with little regard to limitations on state power. The American founding, by contrast, was obsessed with constitution-making. Both countries got to genuine democracy. But in France it took two centuries, five republics, two empires and one dictatorship before getting there. Surely we want to do it better in Iraq.